TO REBATE OR NOT TO REBATE: FUEL ECONOMY STANDARDS VERSUS FEEBATES

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Durrmeyer, Isis; Samano, Mario
• 署名单位: Universite de Toulouse; Universite de Montreal; HEC Montreal
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12555
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 3076-3116
• 关键词: UNITED-STATES; MARKET; impacts; models; cost

摘要

We compare the welfare effects in equilibrium of two environmental regulations that aim at increasing the new cars fleet's average fuel efficiency: the fuel economy standards and the feebate policies. Maintaining the same environmental benefit and tax revenue, we simulate each policy in France and the US. Standard-type policies have larger negative welfare effects, up to 1.7 times those from the feebate. Effects on manufacturers are heterogeneous: some are better off under the feebate. A market to trade levels of fuel efficiency dominates the simple standard regulation and the feebate. We also consider the attribute-based standard and technological improvements.