Revisiting the Classical View of Benefit-based Taxation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Weinzierl, Matthew
• 署名单位: Harvard University
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12462
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: F37-F64
• 关键词: public-goods; Distributional implications; Voting game; tax; POLICY; core

摘要

This article incorporates into modern optimal tax theory the classical logic of benefit-based taxation in which an individual's benefit from the activities of the state is tied to his or her income-earning ability. First-best optimal policy is characterised analytically as depending on a few potentially estimable statistics. Constrained optimal policy, with a Pareto-efficient objective that trades off this principle and conventional utilitarianism, is simulated using conventional constraints and methods. A wide range of optimal policy outcomes can result, including those that match well several features of existing policies. This analysis thereby contributes to the theory of positive optimal taxation.