RISK AND TEMPTATION: A META-STUDY ON PRISONER'S DILEMMA GAMES

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mengel, Friederike
• 署名单位: University of Essex; Lund University
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12548
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 3182-3209
• 关键词: public-goods; rational cooperation; Social dilemmas; BEHAVIOR; GENDER; IMPACT

摘要

This article reports the results of a meta-study of 96 prisoner's dilemma studies comprising more than 3,500 participants. I disentangle the role of 'risk' (to co-operate unilaterally) and 'temptation' (to defect against a co-operator) and find that: (i) an index of risk best explains the variation in cooperation rates across one-shot games, while (ii) an index of temptation best explains the variation in finitely repeated games. Risk and temptation indices also affect gender comparisons. Women are more co-operative than the average man if risk is low and less co-operative if risk is high. There are no gender differences on average.