Evaluating Vacancy Referrals and the Roles of Sanctions and Sickness Absence

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: van den Berg, Gerard J.; Hofmann, Barbara; Uhlendorff, Arne
• 署名单位: University of Bristol; University of Groningen; IZA Institute Labor Economics; Leibniz Association; Zentrum fur Europaische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW); Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); ENSAE Paris; Leibniz Association; DIW Berlin - Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1093/ej/uez032
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 3292-3322
• 关键词: dynamic discrete-choice; unemployment; insurance; PROGRAMS; duration

摘要

Job vacancy referrals are a common active labour market policy measure. Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. During sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behaviour do not apply. This may reduce the threat effect of sanctions. We study effects of vacancy referrals and sanctions on unemployment duration and job match quality. We find that a vacancy referral increases the transition rate into work. We also find a positive effect of a vacancy referral on the probability of reporting sick.