BIAS AND NEGLIGENCE WITH FREEDOM OF INFORMATION

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Argenziano, Rossella; Weeds, Helen
• 署名单位: University of Essex; Imperial College London
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1093/ej/uez026
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 2979-2998
• 关键词: Persuasion; IMPACT

摘要

We analyse decision-making in the presence of Freedom of Information (FOI) rules. A decision-maker chooses whether to acquire costly information to inform his decision regarding a policy action. If information is not disclosed voluntarily a monitor may open a costly investigation, using FOI to access the information. A finding of biased decision-making or negligence in information acquisition generates a reward to the monitor and a penalty to the decision-maker. We find that strengthening FOI to reduce the cost of investigation may increase negligence without necessarily reducing bias. Moreover, increasing the reward for discovering negligence can paradoxically increase negligence in equilibrium.