SIR, YES, SIR! HIERARCHY, COUPS AND THE POLITICAL PREFERENCES OF ARMY OFFICERS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fajardo, Gustavo
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1093/ej/ueaa012
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 1317-1345
• 关键词: POWER

摘要

I show that coups that break the chain of command polarise the military along hierarchical lines. I study an instance of Venezuelan history in which the political preferences of individual members of the army towards former coup leader Hugo Chavez became observable. Outranking Chavez at the time of the insubordination increases the probability of later opposing his presidency. Causal estimates rely on a fuzzy regression discontinuity design, where minimum time requirements for promotion in the army provide exogenous variation in the ranking of officers at the time of the coup. I discuss implications for the literature on civil-military relations.