TIMING OF COMMUNICATION

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bhattacharya, Puja; Nielsen, Kirby; Sengupta, Arjun
• 署名单位: University of Arkansas System; University of Arkansas Fayetteville; Stanford University; Ruprecht Karls University Heidelberg
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1093/ej/ueaa042
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 1623-1649
• 关键词: promises; COORDINATION; deception; people

摘要

Using an experiment, we demonstrate that a communication regime in which a worker communicates about his intended effort is less effective in: (i) soliciting truthful information; and (ii) motivating effort than one in which he communicates about his past effort. Our experiment uses a real-effort task, which additionally allows us to demonstrate the effects of communication on effort over time. We show that the timing of communication affects the dynamic pattern of work. In both treatments, individuals are most co-operative closest to the time of communication. Our results reveal that the timing of communication is a critical feature that merits attention in the design of mechanisms for information transmission in strategic settings.