Beyond the Spanish MIR with consent: (Hidden) cooperation and coordination in matching

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Alcalde, Jose
• 署名单位: Universitat d'Alacant
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.03.007
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 32-49
• 关键词: MIR with consent; Hidden cooperation; COORDINATION; Matching mechanisms

摘要

Sequential mechanisms to solve matching problems are useful to promote (hidden) cooperation between agents. Taking as a starting point the MIRC mechanism, employed in Spain to match medical students and residency programs in privately owned hospitals, we find that: (1) In the current system, where the number of students that each program might enroll is limited, the unique equilibrium allocation can be unstable. (2) When the above limit is not (formally) imposed, instability is not expected to occur. Nevertheless, the multiplicity of equilibria shows that coordination failure might emerge, generating a social welfare loss. (3) When the role of students and hospitals is reversed in the MIRC mechanism, (hidden) cooperation is guaranteed. Moreover, coordination failure disappears. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.