Stable biased sampling

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Haefner, Samuel
• 署名单位: University of Basel
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.11.006
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 109-122
• 关键词: Sampling best response dynamics; Sampling bias; Two-speed dynamics; Tikhonov's theorem; Practical asymptotic stability

摘要

This paper analyzes an indirect evolutionary model of sampling biases in probability estimates, which combines the sampling best response dynamics with the replicator dynamics. The arrival rate of revision opportunities in the best response dynamics is high, so that the resulting joint dynamical system is a slow-fast system and we can use Tikhonov's theorem to study its solutions, employing practical asymptotic stability as a stability criterion. For two-strategy population games with a unique Nash equilibrium that is in mixed strategies, we find that the stable sampling bias is generically non-zero and that it is highest when the equilibrium is most asymmetric, yet that the stable sampling bias vanishes in the sample size. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.