BUREAUCRAT ALLOCATION IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR: EVIDENCE FROM THE WORLD BANK

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Limodio, Nicola
• 署名单位: Bocconi University
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1093/ej/ueab008
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 3012-3040
• 关键词: financial incentives; management-practices; political-economy; FIRMS; origins; IMPACT; style

摘要

The allocation of bureaucrats across tasks constitutes a pivotal instrument for achieving an organisation's objectives. In this paper, I measure the performance of World Bank bureaucrats by combining the universe of task assignment with an evaluation of task outcome and bureaucrat CVs. I introduce two stylised facts. First, bureaucrat performance correlates with task features and individual characteristics. Second, there exists a negative assortative matching between high-performing bureaucrats and low-performing countries. In response to natural disasters, which may further weaken countries' performance, I observe that low-performing countries receive an additional allocation of high-performing bureaucrats. I discuss various interpretations of these findings.