MULTI-LATERAL CONTRACTING WITH MANIPULATION

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Antler, Yair
• 署名单位: Tel Aviv University
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1093/ej/ueab013
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 2693-2725
• 关键词: mechanism-design; collusion; networks; auctions; games

摘要

We study multi-lateral risk sharing when the state of nature is unverifiable, so that contracts are conditioned on a state-dependent signal (e.g., net earnings in a financial report). A subset of the agents can manipulate the signal's realisation at some cost and, as a result, Pareto-optimal reallocation of risk is precluded. The agents can write additional side contracts that can be used to incentivise one of the parties to manipulate the signal. Using a novel stability notion that takes into account agents' beliefs about contemporaneous deviations initiated by their counter-parties, we explore the limits of risk sharing and risk bearing.