FRAUD DETERRENCE INSTITUTIONS REDUCE INTRINSIC HONESTY

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Galeotti, Fabio; Maggian, Valeria; Villeval, Marie Claire
• 署名单位: Universita Ca Foscari Venezia
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1093/ej/ueab018
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 2508-2528
• 关键词: hidden costs; Social norm; PUNISHMENT; COOPERATION; crime; ENFORCEMENT; CORRUPTION; BEHAVIOR; culture

摘要

The impact of deterrence institutions beyond their immediate scope of application is unknown. Using a quasi-experiment with naturally occurring variation in inspections, we found evidence of spillover effects across contexts. We identified fraudsters and non-fraudsters on public transport who were or not exposed to ticket inspections. We measured the intrinsic honesty of the same persons in a new context where they could misappropriate money. Instead of having an educative effect across contexts, the exposure to deterrence practices increased unethical behaviour of fraudsters but also, strikingly, of non-fraudsters. Learning about the prevailing norm is the likely channel of this spillover effect.