POLITICAL ACTIVISM AND THE PROVISION OF DYNAMIC INCENTIVES: GROWING THE PIE IN THE BATTLE FOR REDISTRIBUTION

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Camous, Antoine; Cooper, Russell
• 署名单位: University of Mannheim; European University Institute
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1093/ej/ueab015
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 2824-2855
• 关键词: Capital taxation; social-mobility; voter turnout; preferences; COMPETITION; tax

摘要

This paper studies the determination of income taxes in a dynamic setting with human capital accumulation. The goal is to understand the factors that support an outcome without complete redistribution. given a majority of relatively poor agents and the inability to commit to future taxes. All agents agree ex ante that limiting tax and transfers is beneficial but a majority favours large redistribution, ex post. at the time of the vote. in a political influence game, group activism limits the support for expropriatory taxation and preserves incentives. In some cases. the outcome corresponds to the optimal allocation under commitment.