HOLDING A GROUP TOGETHER: NON-GAME THEORY VERSUS GAME THEORY

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Richter, Michael; Rubinstein, Ariel
• 署名单位: University of London; Tel Aviv University; New York University
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1093/ej/ueab026
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 2629-2641
• 关键词: equilibrium

摘要

Each member of a group chooses a position and has preferences regarding his chosen position. The group's harmony depends on the profile of chosen positions meeting a specific condition. We analyse a solution concept (Richter and Rubinstein, 2020) based on a permissible set of individual positions, which plays a role analogous to that of prices in competitive equilibrium. Given the permissible set, members choose their most preferred position. The set is tightened if the chosen positions are inharmonious and relaxed if the restrictions are unnecessary. This new equilibrium concept yields more attractive outcomes than does Nash equilibrium in the corresponding game.