Competing Sales Channels with Captive Consumers

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ronayne, David; Taylor, Greg
• 署名单位: University of Oxford
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1093/ej/ueab075
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 741-766
• 关键词: Unique equilibrium; price-competition; generalized-model; search; INFORMATION; number

摘要

We study strategic interactions in markets in which firms sell to consumers both directly and via a competitive channel, such as a price comparison website or marketplace, where multiple sellers' offers are visible at once. We ask how a competitive channel's size influences market outcomes when some consumers have limited price information. A bigger competitive channel means that more consumers compare prices, increasing within-channel competition. However, we show that such seemingly pro-competitive developments can raise prices and harm consumers by weakening between-channel competition.