Designing Effective Teacher Performance Pay Programs: Experimental Evidence from Tanzania*

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mbiti, Isaac; Romero, Mauricio; Schipper, Youdi
• 署名单位: University of Virginia; National Bureau of Economic Research; IZA Institute Labor Economics; Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1093/ej/uead010
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 1968-2000
• 关键词: student-achievement evidence; incentives; education; KNOWLEDGE; outcomes; impacts; ACCOUNTABILITY; LABOR; skill

摘要

We use a nationally representative field experiment in Tanzania to compare two teacher performance pay systems in public primary schools: a 'pay-for-percentile' system (a rank-order tournament) and a 'levels' system that features multiple proficiency thresholds. Pay for percentile can potentially induce socially optimal effort among teachers, while levels systems can encourage teachers to focus on students near passing thresholds. Despite the theoretical advantage of the tournament system, we find that both systems improved student test scores across the distribution of initial learning levels after two years. However, the levels system is easier to implement and is more cost effective.