Partitioned Pricing and Collusion on Surcharges

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chen, Zhiqi
• 署名单位: Carleton University
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1093/ej/uead044
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 2614-2639
• 关键词: equilibrium; search; MODEL; fees

摘要

Partitioned pricing is a pricing practice that divides the price of a product into a base price and one or more mandatory surcharges. This paper develops a theory of partitioned pricing using a duopoly model where the owner of each firm determines the surcharge, but delegates the setting of the base price to a manager. In equilibrium, both firms choose partitioned pricing over the conventional all-inclusive pricing. Moreover, partitioned pricing leads to higher full prices and larger profits than all-inclusive pricing. Most surprisingly, collusion on surcharges without any coordination on base prices is as profitable as collusion on all-inclusive prices.