Healthcare Appointments as Commitment Devices

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Derksen, Laura; Kerwin, Jason T.; Reynoso, Natalia Ordaz; Sterck, Olivier
• 署名单位: University of Toronto; University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; IZA Institute Labor Economics; Bocconi University; University of Oxford; University of Antwerp
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1093/ej/ueae077
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 81-118
• 关键词: field experiment; self-control; antiretroviral therapy; Reminders; demand; temptation; prevention; dont

摘要

We show that ordinary appointments can act as effective substitutes for hard commitment devices and increase demand for a critical healthcare service, particularly among those with self-control problems. We show this using an experiment that randomly offered HIV testing appointments and hard commitment devices to high-risk men in Malawi. Appointments more than double testing rates, with effects concentrated among those who demand commitment. In contrast, most men who take up hard commitments lose their investments. Appointments overcome commitment problems without the potential drawback of commitment failure, and have the potential to increase demand for healthcare in the developing world.