Strategic Conformity or Anti-Conformity to Avoid Punishment and Attract Reward

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dvorak, Fabian; Fischbacher, Urs; Schmelz, Katrin
• 署名单位: University of Konstanz; Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; Swiss Federal Institute of Aquatic Science & Technology (EAWAG); University of Konstanz; University of Konstanz; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Technical University of Denmark
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1093/ej/ueae085
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 556-583
• 关键词: social-influence; coordination games; MODEL; uniqueness; EVOLUTION; others; NORMS; preferences; exploration; contagion

摘要

We provide systematic insights on strategic conformist-as well as anti-conformist-behaviour in situations where people are evaluated, i.e., where an individual has to be selected for reward (e.g., promotion) or punishment (e.g., layoffs). To affect the probability of being selected, people may attempt to fit in or stand out in order to affect the chances of being noticed or liked by the evaluator. We investigate such strategic incentives for conformity or anti-conformity experimentally in three different domains: facts, taste and creativity. To distinguish conformity and anti-conformity from independence, we introduce a new experimental design that allows us to predict participants' independent choices based on transitivity. We find that the prospect of punishment increases conformity, while the prospect of reward reduces it. Anti-conformity emerges in the prospect of reward, but only under specific circumstances. Similarity-based selection (i.e., homophily) is much more important for the evaluators' decisions than salience. We also employ a theoretical approach to illustrate strategic key mechanisms of our experimental setting.