Data-Driven Envelopment with Privacy-Policy Tying

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Condorelli, Daniele; Padilla, Jorge
• 署名单位: University of Warwick
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1093/ej/uead090
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 515-536
• 关键词: learning-curve; entry; INFORMATION; INVESTMENT

摘要

We present a theory of monopoly protection by means of entry in adjacent markets that have a common customer base (i.e., envelopment). A firm dominant in its market enters a data-rich secondary market and engages in predatory pricing and privacy-policy tying. We define the latter as conditioning service provision to the subscription of a privacy policy that allows bundling of user data across all sources. Acquiring data from the secondary market confers an advantage in the data-intensive primary market that shields the dominant firm from entry, thus harming consumers. We discuss potential remedies, including data unbundling and portability.