Nudging for Tax Compliance: A Meta-Analysis

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Antinyan, Armenak; Asatryan, Zareh
• 署名单位: Leibniz Association; Zentrum fur Europaische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.1093/ej/ueae088
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 1033-1068
• 关键词: field experiment; enforcement strategies; Nudges; INFORMATION; deterrence; ECONOMICS; Reminders; insights; taxation; evasion

摘要

Governments increasingly use nudges to improve tax collection. We synthesise the growing literature on nudging experiments using meta-analytical methods. We find that, relative to the baseline where about a quarter of taxpayers are compliant, simple reminders increase the probability of compliance by 2.7 percentage points, while tax morale and deterrence nudges increase compliance by an additional 1.4 and 3.2 percentage points. Our further results highlight the conditions where nudges are more or less effective. Overall, our findings imply that taxpayers are biased by various informational and behavioural constraints, and that nudges can be of some help in overcoming these frictions.