Statistical discrimination and affirmative action in the lab

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dianat, Ahrash; Echenique, Federico; Yariv, Leeat
• 署名单位: University of Essex; California Institute of Technology; Princeton University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.11.013
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 41-58
• 关键词: statistical discrimination; affirmative action; experiments

摘要

We present results from laboratory experiments studying statistical discrimination and affirmative action. We induce statistical discrimination in simple labor-market interactions between firms and workers. We then introduce affirmative-action policies that vary in the size and duration of a subsidy that firms receive for hiring discriminated-against workers. These different affirmative-action policies have nearly the same effect, and practically eliminate discriminatory hiring practices. However, once lifted, few positive effects remain and discrimination reverts to its initial levels. One exception is lengthy affirmative-action policies, which exhibit somewhat longer-lived effects. Stickiness of beliefs, which we elicit, helps explain the observed outcomes. (C) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.