Delegated expertise: Implementability with peer-monitoring

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Azrieli, Yaron
• 署名单位: University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.12.008
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 240-254
• 关键词: Implementation; moral hazard; information acquisition; monitoring

摘要

A decision maker would like to delegate the acquisition of information to an expert, but is unable to observe the expert's actions, nor is she able to postpone the payment to the expert until the truth is revealed. If the expert can manipulate their report of the realized signal then incentivizing information acquisition is typically impossible. However, by hiring multiple experts and making the payments contingent on the entire vector of signals the decision maker can obtain useful information. We characterize the implementable vectors of information structures. In particular, we show that if one vector of structures is implementable then any vector of more informative structures is implementable as well. (c) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.