RECIPROCITY WITHOUT COMMITMENT - CHARACTERIZATION AND PERFORMANCE OF INFORMAL INSURANCE ARRANGEMENTS
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
COATE, S; RAVALLION, M
署名单位：
The World Bank; University of Pennsylvania
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0304-3878
DOI：
10.1016/0304-3878(93)90102-S
发表日期：
1993
页码：
1-24
关键词：
摘要：
Various risk sharing arrangements are common in underdeveloped agrarian economies where households have no formal means of contract enforcement and little access to risk markets. Social insurance is still possible through repeated interaction in an environment with few informational asymmetries. In a simple repeated game model of two self-interested households facing independent income streams, we characterize the best arrangement that can be sustained as a noncooperative equilibrium. We establish precisely how this optimal informal arrangement differs from first best-risk sharing, and identify the conditions under which the divergence between the two is greatest.
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