Separation of powers and development

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Laffont, JJ; Meleu, M
• 署名单位: Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Universite Felix Houphouet-Boigny
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3878
• DOI: 10.1016/S0304-3878(00)00127-9
• 发表日期: 2001
• 页码: 129-145
• 关键词: corruption; incentives; Development; separation of powers

摘要

We model separation of powers as an instrument against corruption, more specifically as a way to decrease the costs of collusion-proofness. Then, we show that the value of this institutional design is higher in developing countries. Unfortunately, the same reasons which are behind this higher value also increase the implementation cost of this institution. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: D7; H5; O12.