Who gets credit? The behavior of bureaucrats and state banks in allocating credit to Chinese state-owned enterprises

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cull, R; Xu, LXC
• 署名单位: The World Bank
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3878
• DOI: 10.1016/S0304-3878(03)00039-7
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 533-559
• 关键词: china; SOE reform; signaling; banking; financial policy

摘要

Using a sample of Chinese state-owned enterprises spanning 1980 to 1994, we investigate the factors that determine the sources of finance for firm-level fixed investment, including retained earnings, bank finance, and government transfers. Direct government transfers were not significantly associated with profitability throughout the period. In contrast, bank finance was positively linked to both profitability and some types of reform. Reforms that enabled managers to self-select, and thus expose themselves (and their employees) to greater risk, were positively associated with acquiring bank finance. The association between bank finance and profitability weakened in the 1990s as banks increasingly assumed bailout responsibility. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.