Household bargaining and microfinance

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Van Tassel, E
• 署名单位: State University System of Florida; Florida Atlantic University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3878
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2003.07.003
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 449-468
• 关键词: Household bargaining; credit markets; GENDER

摘要

This paper examines a household bargaining problem where one household member can use external finance to invest in an uncertain business project. Faced with limited income generating opportunities, we show that the household member will consistently choose safe investment projects. We also explain why other members of the household can be made worse off from investment, even when aggregate household consumption is expected to rise. In a dynamic version of the bargaining problem, we study incentives for the household to contribute towards loan repayments and identify conditions under which the borrower will transfer control over her loan to her partner. (C) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.