Group-lending: Sequential financing, lender monitoring and joint liability

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chowdhury, PR
• 署名单位: Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3878
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2004.05.005
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 415-439
• 关键词: group-lending; Joint liability; peer monitoring; Sequential financing; under-monitoring; lender monitoring

摘要

We develop a simple model of group-lending based on peer monitoring and moral hazard. We find that, in the absence of sequential financing or lender monitoring, group-lending schemes may involve under-monitoring with the borrowers investing in undesirable projects. Moreover, under certain parameter configurations, group-lending schemes involving either sequential financing, or a combination of lender monitoring and joint liability are feasible. In fact, group-lending schemes with sequential financing may succeed even in the absence of joint liability, though the repayment rate will be lower. In the absence of joint liability, however, group-lending with lender monitoring is unlikely to be feasible. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.