Bank privatization in Argentina: A model of political constraints and differential outcomes

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Clarke, GRG; Cull, R
• 署名单位: The World Bank
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3878
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2004.06.010
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 133-155
• 关键词: argentina; bank privatization; political economy

摘要

Although case studies suggest that political constraints affect bank privatization transactions, these constraints have been neither theoretically modeled nor econometrically tested. This paper presents a simple model of the tradeoffs governments and buyers face during these transactions. In addition to price, the buyer is concerned about solvency and profitability following privatization. Similarly, politicians are concerned about layoffs and service coverage. We apply the framework to provincial bank privatizations in Argentina, finding that provinces with fiscal problems were willing to accept more layoffs and guarantee more of the privatized bank's portfolio in return for a higher price. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.