Informal sector: The credit market channel

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Straub, S
• 署名单位: University of Edinburgh
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3878
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jdevevo.2004.09.005
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 299-321
• 关键词: Formal and informal sectors; credit markets; institutional arrangements

摘要

We build a model of firms' choice between formality and informality. Complying with costly registration procedures allows the firms to benefit from key public goods, enforcement, of property lights and contracts, that make the participation in the formal credit market possible. In a moral hazard framework with credit rationing, their decision is shaped by the interaction between the cost of entry into formality, and the relative efficiency of formal versus informal credit. mechanisms and their related institutional arrangements. The model is consistent with existing stylized facts on the determinants of informality. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V All rights reserved.