Private enforcement and social efficiency

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Anderson, JE; Bandiera, O
• 署名单位: University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Boston College; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3878
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2004.05.003
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 341-366
• 关键词: Property rights; private enforcement

摘要

This paper makes precise the distributional consequences and social efficiency of private enforcement of property rights. Properties of different values are subject to predation and owners choose between self-defense and private enforcement services. A distributional conflict of interest arises as private protection purchased by rich owners deflects predators on low value properties. The market structure of enforcement and development affect the distribution of property income through relative changes in the security of high and low values property. Moreover, because of the externality enforcers impose on poorer owners, the availability of private enforcement may constrain the policy of a benevolent State. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.