Institutional traps and economic growth

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gradstein, Mark
• 署名单位: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev; IZA Institute Labor Economics
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2008.00505.x
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 1043-1066
• 关键词: Democracy; INEQUALITY; PROTECTION; MODEL

摘要

This article's point of departure is that low-quality institutions, concentration of political power and material wealth, and underdevelopment are persistent over time. Its analytical model views an equal distribution of political power as a commitment device to enhance institutional quality, thereby promoting growth. The politically powerful coalition contemplates relinquishing of its power through democratization, weighing this advantageous consequence against the limit on own appropriative ability that it entails. The possibility of two developmental paths is exhibited: with concentration of political and economic power, low-quality institutions, and slow growth; and a more equal distribution of political and economic resources, high-quality institutions, and faster growth.