Optimal fiscal policy in the design of social security reforms

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Conesa, Juan C.; Garriga, Carlos
• 署名单位: Autonomous University of Barcelona; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - St. Louis
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2008.00480.x
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 291-318
• 关键词: equilibrium; EFFICIENCY

摘要

The quantitative literature has documented that a privatization of the social security system generates large long-run welfare gains at the cost of welfare losses for transition generations. In this article, we maximize over the entire policy space, following the optimal fiscal policy approach. The resulting allocation, by construction, lies on the constrained Pareto frontier. We find that the optimal design of reforms exhibits sizeable welfare gains arising from a reduction in labor supply distortions. In contrast, the welfare gains coming from the reduction of savings distortions are relatively small.