EDUCATIONAL VOUCHERS AND CREAM SKIMMING

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Epple, Dennis; Romano, Richard
• 署名单位: State University System of Florida; University of Florida; Carnegie Mellon University; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2008.00516.x
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 1395-1435
• 关键词: schools benefit students; public-schools; income-distribution; club economies; financial-aid; PRIVATE; COMPETITION; stratification; universities; equilibrium

摘要

Epple and Romano (1998) show equilibrium provision of education by public and private schools has the latter skim off the wealthiest and most-able students, and universal vouchers lead to further cream skimming. Here we study voucher design that injects private-school competition and increases technical efficiencies without cream skimming. Conditioning vouchers on student ability without restriction on participating schools' policies fails to affect significantly cream skimming. However, by adding restrictions like tuition constraints, such vouchers can reap the benefits of school competition without increased stratification. This is accomplished while allowing voluntary participation in the voucher system and without tax increases.