International migration, imperfect information, and brain drain

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dequiedt, Vianney; Zenou, Yves
• 署名单位: Universite Clermont Auvergne (UCA); Stockholm University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3878
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2013.02.002
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 62-78
• 关键词: Asymmetric information; Self-selection of migrants; Skill-biased migration

摘要

We consider a model of international migration where skills of workers are imperfectly observed by firms in the host country and where information asymmetries are more severe for immigrants. than for natives. Because of imperfect information, firms statistically dicriminate highly-skilled migrants by paying them at their expected productivity. The decision of whether to migrate or not depends on the proportion of highly-skilled workers among the migrants. The migration game exhibits strategic complementarities, which, because of standard coordination problems, lead to multiple equilibria. We characterize them and examine how international migration affects the income of individuals in sending and receiving countries, and of migrants themselves. We also analyze under which conditions there is positive or negative self-selection of migrants. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.