INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND MULTIMARKET CONTACT

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Choi, Jay Pil; Gerlach, Heiko
• 署名单位: University of Queensland; University of New South Wales Sydney; Michigan State University
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2012.00695.x
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 635-657
• 关键词: leniency; PROGRAMS

摘要

This article analyzes cartel formation and international antitrust enforcement when multinational firms operate in several jurisdictions with local antitrust authorities. We are concerned with how the sustainability of collusion in one local market is affected by the existence of collusion in other markets when they are linked by a negative demand relationship. The interdependence of cartel stability across markets leads to potential externalities in antitrust enforcement across jurisdictions. Local antitrust enforcement equilibrium enforcement may exhibit a nonmonotonicity in the degree of market integration. We compare it with globally optimal antitrust enforcement policy and discuss the role of international antitrust coordination.