Acute morbidity and labor outcomes in Mexico: Testing the role of labor contracts as an income smoothing mechanism

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gutierrez, Federico H.
• 署名单位: Vanderbilt University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3878
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2014.05.009
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 1-12
• 关键词: implicit contracts; Acute morbidity; illness; Health shocks; Mexico; occupational choice

摘要

Economic development is associated with an increase in the share of workers in salaried jobs. This process may be accompanied by a reduction in wage fluctuations if labor contracts are used as income smoothing mechanisms. This paper tests to what extent salaried jobs help reduce the volatility of wages by insuring workers against productivity shocks. Analysis of MxFLS data indicates that the average contractual arrangement in Mexico insures the worker against idiosyncratic productivity fluctuations associated with episodes of illness. The evidence is stronger for workers in formal jobs. To validate the methodology, the test is also implemented on a sample of self-employed workers. In this case, it correctly rejects the presence of insurance against productivity shocks. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.