Group versus individual liability: Short and long term evidence from Philippine microcredit lending groups

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gine, Xavier; Karlan, Dean S.
• 署名单位: The World Bank; Yale University; Innovations for Poverty Action (IPA); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3878
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2013.11.003
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 65-83
• 关键词: Microfinance; group lending; Group liability; Joint liability; Social capital; Micro-enterprises; Informal economies; Access to finance

摘要

Group liability in microcredit purports to improve repayment rates through peer screening, monitoring, and enforcement. However, it may create excessive pressure, and discourage reliable clients from borrowing. Two randomized trials tested the overall effect, as well as specific mechanisms. The first removed group liability from pre-existing groups and the second randomly assigned villages to either group or individual liability loans. In both, groups still held weekly meetings. We find no increase in short-run or long-run default and larger groups after three years in pre-existing areas, and no change in default but fewer groups created after two years in the expansion areas. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.