Shared accountability and partial decentralization in local public good provision

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Joanis, Marcelin
• 署名单位: University of Sherbrooke; Universite de Montreal
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3878
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2013.11.002
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 28-37
• 关键词: Partial decentralization; ACCOUNTABILITY; Shared responsibility; Local public goods; Vertical interactions

摘要

Recent decentralization reforms in developing countries have often lead to the coexistence of multiple tiers of government in given policy areas, triggering new accountability issues. This paper provides a novel theoretical treatment of the efficiency consequences of such 'partial expenditure decentralization.' It develops a political agency model in which two levels of government are involved in the provision of a local public good, with voters imperfectly informed about each government's contribution to the public good. A central result of the model is that partial decentralization is desirable only if the benefits of vertical complementarity in public good provision outweigh the costs of reduced accountability, which result from detrimental vertical strategic interactions operating through the electoral process. Through variants of the model, the interplay between decentralization and democratization is analyzed. From a positive point of view, the model predicts a relationship between electoral incentives and equilibrium decentralization. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.