Do elected leaders in a limited democracy have real power? Evidence from rural China

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mu, Ren; Zhang, Xiaobo
• 署名单位: Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; Bush School of Government & Public Service; Peking University; CGIAR; International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3878
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2013.10.009
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 17-27
• 关键词: Allocations of public goods; favoritism; election; Appointed leader; CHINA

摘要

Do elected leaders in an authoritarian regime have any real power? Does grassroots democracy in a one-party state entail parochial problems? Making use of primary survey data covering two election cycles in a mountainous area of China, where an administrative village consists of several natural villages (NVs), we find that elected village heads favor their home NVs in resource allocations, especially when these NVs have a large population. In contrast, the home NVs of appointed Communist Party secretaries do not receive disproportionately more resources, on average. This pattern of resource allocation is compatible with the interest of village heads and suggests that as elected leaders, village heads have some true power in resource distribution. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.