Contractual structure in agriculture with endogenous matching

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ghatak, Maitreesh; Karaivanov, Alexander
• 署名单位: University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Simon Fraser University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3878
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2013.05.005
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 239-249
• 关键词: Tenancy; Sharecropping; Endogenous matching

摘要

We analyze optimal contractual forms and equilibrium matching in a double-sided moral hazard model of sharecropping similar to Eswaran and Kotwal (1985). We show that, with endogenous matching, the presence of moral hazard can reverse the matching pattern relative to the first best, and that even if sharecropping is optimal for an exogenously given pair of agent types, it may not be observed in equilibrium with endogenous matching. The economy with endogenous matching features less sharecropping compared to an economy with agent types drawn at random from the same distribution. This suggests that studies of agency costs in sharecropping may underestimate their extent if focusing only on the intensive margin and ignoring the extensive margin. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.