Strategic sourcing and wage bargaining

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Sly, Nicholas; Soderbery, Anson
• 署名单位: University of Oregon; Purdue University System; Purdue University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3878
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2014.04.005
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 172-187
• 关键词: Strategic sourcing; Wage bargaining; Price markups; multiproduct firms

摘要

We examine how multinational firms strategically source production to mitigate the consequences of wage bargaining with workers. When wage bargaining pressure differs across countries, firms allocate production of goods with high markups toward countries with relatively competitive labor markets, limiting the rents available to workers with strong bargaining power. We use product-level data from the universe of automotive production facilities in North America at a monthly frequency between 1988 and 2009 to structurally estimate variable price elasticities of demand for different vehicles. From the theory we derive an empirical strategy that allows us to distinguish the impact of wage bargaining pressure from other sourcing motives. We find robust evidence that multinational firms strategically source their products across countries in response to differences in wage bargaining pressure. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.