EXCHANGE RATE MANIPULATION AND CONSTRUCTIVE AMBIGUITY

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fernholz, Ricardo T.
• 署名单位: Claremont Colleges; Claremont Graduate University; Claremont McKenna College
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12139
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 1323-1348
• 关键词: central bank intervention; Speculative attacks; social value; INFORMATION; MARKET; expectations; aggregation

摘要

I consider dynamic models in which investors are heterogeneously informed about both foreign exchange interventions and exchange rate fundamentals and show that transparency sometimes exacerbates misalignment between the exchange rate and fundamentals. Although transparency reveals information about fundamentals, it also increases the precision of the exchange rate as a signal of those fundamentals that remain unknown (the signal-precision effect of transparency). If a central bank announcement reveals little information about fundamentals, then this effect dominates and transparency magnifies misalignment. One implication is that ambiguity can increase the effectiveness of intervention to support a declining currency during times of crisis.