LEGISLATED PROTECTION AND THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Bowen, T. Renee
署名单位：
Stanford University
刊物名称：
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
ISSN/ISSBN：
0020-6598
DOI：
10.1111/iere.12140
发表日期：
2015
页码：
1349-1384
关键词：
摘要：
Tariff bindings and administered protection are two characteristics of the World Trade Organization (WTO) that are little understood. Tariff bindings place a ceiling on tariffs that is not always reached, whereas administered protection provides all industries with some minimum import protection, effectively creating a floor for protection. How do these policies affect applied most favored nation (MFN) tariff rates that are enacted through the legislature? I model tariffs determined by a dynamic legislative process and show that low applied MFN tariffs are less likely with tariff bindings and more likely with administered protection than under purely legislated protection.
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