PLAYING THE FERTILITY GAME AT WORK: AN EQUILIBRIUM MODEL OF PEER EFFECTS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ciliberto, Federico; Miller, Amalia R.; Nielsen, Helena Skyt; Simonsen, Marianne
• 署名单位: University of Virginia; Aarhus University
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12177
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 827-856
• 关键词: Multiple equilibria; identification; MARKET; INFORMATION; COMPETITION; community; BEHAVIOR; choices; time; gap

摘要

We study workplace peer effects in fertility decisions using a game theory model of strategic interactions among coworkers that allows for multiple equilibria. Using register-based data on fertile-aged women working in medium-sized establishments in Denmark, we uncover negative average peer effects. Allowing for heterogeneous effects by worker type, we find that positive effects dominate across worker types defined by age or education. Negative effects dominate within age groups and among low-education types. Policy simulations show that these estimated effects make the distribution of where women work an important consideration, beyond simply if they work, in predicting population fertility.