ON THE WELFARE PROPERTIES OF FRACTIONAL RESERVE BANKING

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Sanches, Daniel
• 署名单位: Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Philadelphia
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12181
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 935-954
• 关键词: Private money; search; MODEL

摘要

Monetary economists have long recognized a tension between the benefits of fractional reserve banking, such as the ability to undertake more profitable (long-term) investment opportunities, and the difficulties associated with it, such as the risk of insolvency for each bank and the associated losses to bank liability holders. I show that a specific banking arrangement (a joint-liability scheme) provides an effective mechanism for ensuring the ex post transfer of reserves from liquid banks to illiquid banks, so it is possible to select a socially efficient reserve ratio in the banking system that preserves the safety of bank liabilities as a store of value and maximizes the rate of return paid to bank liability holders.