CREDIBILITY AND STRATEGIC LEARNING IN NETWORKS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chatterjee, Kalyan; Dutta, Bhaskar
• 署名单位: Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; University of Warwick
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12175
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 759-786
• 关键词: Technology diffusion; signaling games; neighbors

摘要

We analyze a model of diffusion in a fixed, finite connected network. There is an interested party that knows the quality of the product being propagated and chooses an implant in the network to influence other agents to buy. Agents are either innovators, who adopt immediately, or rational. Rational consumers buy if buying instead of waiting maximizes expected utility. We consider the conditions on the network under which optimal diffusion of the good product with probability 1 is a perfect Bayes equilibrium.