ON STRATEGY-PROOFNESS AND THE SALIENCE OF SINGLE-PEAKEDNESS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chatterji, Shurojit; Masso, Jordi
• 署名单位: Singapore Management University; Autonomous University of Barcelona; Barcelona School of Economics
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12266
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 163-189
• 关键词: social choice functions; median voter schemes; maximal domain; preferences; rules; committees

摘要

We consider strategy-proof rules operating on a rich domain of preference profiles. We show that if the rule satisfies in addition tops-onlyness, anonymity, and unanimity, then the preferences in the domain have to satisfy a variant of single-peakedness (referred to as semilattice single-peakedness). We do so by deriving from the rule an endogenous partial order (a semilattice) from which the concept of a semilattice single-peaked preference can be defined. We also provide a converse of this main finding. Finally, we show how well-known restricted domains under which nontrivial strategy-proof rules are admissible are semilattice single-peaked domains.