TRADE DISPUTES AND SETTLEMENT

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Maggi, Giovanni; Staiger, Robert W.
• 署名单位: Yale University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Dartmouth College
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12261
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 19-50
• 关键词: Mechanism design; LIABILITY RULES; property rules; AGREEMENTS; RENEGOTIATION; LITIGATION; ORGANIZATION; CONTRACTS; REMEDIES; PARTIES

摘要

We develop a model of trade agreements with renegotiation and imperfectly verifiable information. In equilibrium, trade disputes can occur and can be resolved in a variety of ways: Governments may settle early or trigger a court ruling, and in the latter case, they may implement the ruling or reach a post-ruling settlement. The model yields predictions on how the dispute outcome depends on the contracting environment and how it correlates with the optimal contract form. We find support for a key prediction of our model using data on the outcomes of actual trade disputes in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization.