COLLECTIVE REPUTATION AND THE DYNAMICS OF STATISTICAL DISCRIMINATION

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kim, Young-Chul; Loury, Glenn C.
• 署名单位: Sogang University; Brown University
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12260
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 3-18
• 关键词: policies; MODEL

摘要

Economists have developed theoretical models identifying self-fulfilling expectations as an important source of statistical discrimination practices. The static models dominating the literature, however, may leave the false impression that a bad equilibrium is as fragile as a bubble and can burst at any moment when expectations flip. By developing a dynamic version of the model, we clarify the limits of expectations-related fragility. Even if group members can coordinate their expectations about future employer behavior, a group with a poor initial collective reputation may still be unable to recover its reputation, implying that the once-developed discriminatory outcomes can be long-standing.